1 0 2 FILED CLERK, U.S.D.C. SOUTHERN DIVISION 3 AUG 2 0 2010 4 5 ALIFORNIA DEPUTY 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RITA REYES. Case No. CV 09-8942 RNB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF 13 VS. COMMISSIONER AND REMANDING FOR FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 14 MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 19 The Court now rules as follows with respect to the three disputed issues listed 20 in the Joint Stipulation.¹ 21 Disputed Issue Nos. 1 and 2 both relate to the finding of the Administrative 22 Law Judge ("ALJ") that plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment 23 24 As the Court advised the parties in its Case Management Order, the 25 decision in this case is being made on the basis of the pleadings, the administrative record ("AR"), and the Joint Stipulation ("Jt Stip") filed by the parties. In accordance 26 with Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has determined 27 which party is entitled to judgment under the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. §

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405(g).

during the relevant period (i.e., the period prior to September 21, 2006). (See AR 506, 537.) Specifically, in his August 7, 2009 decision, the ALJ found:

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"The prior decision found no evidence of a severe mental impairment. No evidence has been submitted for the relevant period prior to September 21, 2006 which would rebut that finding." (AR 506.)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the treating psychologist and treating case manager's "opinion" of plaintiff's functional ability. as reflected in the letter dated November 16, 2006 (see AR 666) and/or in failing to properly consider the Pacific Clinics treatment notes. As to the November 16, 2006 letter, the Court concurs with the Commissioner that the letter on its face purported to opine solely on the severity of plaintiff's current symptoms and did not expressly purport to opine on the severity of plaintiff's mental impairment during the relevant period (i.e., the period prior to September 21, 2006). However, given the proximity of the date of the letter to September 21, 2006 and the fact that it must have been generated in response to a request made earlier than November 16, 2006, it was not reasonable to infer that the opinion expressed therein to the effect that plaintiff's mental impairment rendered her unable to maintain employment applied only to the period beginning September 21, 2006. At the very least, the letter was probative of whether, prior to September 21, 2006, plaintiff's mental impairment(s) had more than a minimal effect on plaintiff's mental ability to perform basic work activities. It therefore was error on the part of the ALJ to disregard plaintiff's psychologist's opinion without stating specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so. See, e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) ("A treating physician's opinion on disability, even if controverted. can be rejected only with specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record."); Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988).²

As to the Pacific Clinics treatment notes, the Commissioner is correct in asserting that the ALJ's prior decision of September 6, 2006 reflects consideration of the Pacific Clinics treatment notes. (See AR 537.) However, the Pacific Clinics treatment notes to which the ALJ was referring in his prior decision were those provided by Pacific Clinics to the SSA on July 30, 2004. (See AR 409-20.) Thus, the ALJ's prior non-severity finding did not include consideration of any of the 2006 treatment notes that were provided in connection with the proceedings on remand. (See AR 712-37.) Those treatment notes, when considered in conjunction with the November 16, 2006 letter, also are probative of whether, prior to September 21, 2006, plaintiff's mental impairment(s) had more than a minimal effect on plaintiff's mental ability to perform basic work activities.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concurs with plaintiff that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the treating psychologist and treating case manager's "opinion" of plaintiff's functional ability, as reflected in the November 16, 2006 letter, and/or in failing to properly consider the Pacific Clinics treatment notes for 2006. It follows that the Court is unable to affirm the ALJ's Step Two finding that plaintiff did not suffer from a severe mental impairment prior to September 21, 2006. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for the Court to reach Disputed Issue No. 3.

To the extent that the Commissioner appears to be contending that the medical opinion of the consultative psychiatrist, Dr. Parikh, alone constitutes substantial evidence on which the ALJ could properly rely in support of his non-severity finding (see Jt Stip at 11-12), the Court disagrees. Dr. Parikh rendered her opinion on March 1, 2003 (see AR 305-10), more than 3-1/2 years prior to the end of the relevant period. The Court also notes that the fact that a treating physician's opinion is contradicted by the opinion of another physician of record is not in itself a sufficient reason to reject the treating physician's opinion, but rather is merely determinative of the governing standard for doing so.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Remand for further proceedings is appropriate where additional proceedings could remedy defects in the Commissioner's decision. See Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). Remand for payment of benefits is appropriate where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits, Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985).

This is not an instance where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings. Rather, the Court concludes that this is an instance where additional administrative proceedings still could remedy the defects in the ALJ's decision, including consideration of an earlier date than September 21, 2006 for commencement of payment of Title XVI benefits.

Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings.

DATED: August 19, 2010

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KOBERT N. BLOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE